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Abstract 
As technology increases in prevalence in people’s daily lives, 
the number of advanced applications are increasing in our 
vehicles. Technology has inherent risks and failures that are 
deemed unavoidable. Luxury vehicles typically incorporate 
more technology than non-luxury vehicles, but consumers 
believe that luxury brands are of higher quality than non-
luxury brands. There appears to be a fundamental disconnect 
between the perceived quality of luxury vehicles and the 
failures associated with technologies incorporated in them. 
This study seeks to examine the effect of technology 
penetration on vehicle recalls and assess whether luxury 
status moderates this effect. To address the question, I use 
secondary data from Ward’s Automotive on US-produced 
sedans from 2003-2011 and run panel regressions to test the 
hypotheses. My results show that technology options appear 
to have no impact on vehicle recalls, and that luxury status 
appears to moderate the relationship between recalls and 
technology options. 
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Introduction 
Oftentimes, purchasing a vehicle is the second-largest expenditure for a household. If a 
consumer is making such a purchase, he or she would want to ensure that the vehicle is of high 
quality and without defect. Consumers today have more resources than ever to learn about their 
prospective vehicles, and oftentimes these resources focus on technology or safety features. Few 
studies focus on expected reliability of such features. It is even more natural to understand why a 
luxury vehicle buyer would want to make sure his or her vehicle is of high quality and reliable. 
With a purchase price larger than a non-luxury vehicle, it is insufficient in a discerning buyer’s 
mind for the luxury vehicle to have only higher quality materials—it must have higher 
operational quality as well.  
One key point that dealerships use to woo buyers into purchasing vehicles is the 
advanced technology within them. One such example is shown in the 2014 Mercedes-Benz S-
Class. It incorporates what the company calls “MAGIC BODY CONTROL;” this innovation 
uses a camera hidden within the vehicle’s windshield to detect road imperfections, and the 
system “instantaneously adjusts the suspension to smooth out harsh road conditions” (Armstead, 
2013). 
It is worth pointing out, however, that technology and IT systems are inherently prone to 
failure. For instance, stability control software has proven troublesome for both Mercedes-Benz 
and Audi in the past (Williams, 2004). It stands to reason that the more sophisticated 
technologies that are placed into a vehicle, the higher risk that vehicle has for technological 
failure. Cars incorporating technology options are essentially complex systems with closely-
linked subsystems. Normal Accidents Theory states that accidents are inevitable in systems that 
are complex and tightly-coupled. Most cars, by extension, could have Normal Accidents Theory 
applied to them (Rijpma, 1997).  The potential safety consequences of an inevitably 
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malfunctioning vehicle system are enormous—enough so that they could potentially cause fatal 
collisions. 
In the automotive industries, catastrophic failures are typically handled in the form of 
recalls. The manufacturer can either perform an involuntary recall (forced by the NHTSA) or a 
voluntary recall (at its discretion). During this process, notifications are sent to vehicle owners 
informing them of the potential malfunction, and owners are invited to take their cars to a 
dealership or service location to be fixed with no charge. On average, this costs manufacturers 
$200 per vehicle (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985). It is estimated that each vehicle recall may cost over 
$20 million (Shah, Ball, & Netessine, 2013). This process is tiresome for consumers, damaging 
to vehicle brands, and expensive for auto manufacturers. 
Luxury buyers believe that luxury brands imply better quality than non-luxury goods 
(Wang, Sun, & Song, 2011). This can be applied in the same sense for new car buyers—they 
believe new cars are of higher quality and more luxurious than used cars. However, depending 
on the model, a used car may actually have fewer future recalls than its new alternative. The 
perceived quality of luxury and new goods is well-established, and these buyers likely assume 
that their vehicles have a higher quality than non-luxury or used vehicles. 
The inclusion of advanced technology and the perceived quality of luxury vehicle seems 
to be conflicting. Studies have compared luxury vehicle recall rates on aggregate with non-
luxury vehicle recall rates, but never before have these studies linked recalls to the factor of 
technology options.  
I hope to fill the gap in this study by examining the effects of technology options on 
vehicle recall rates, and it also analyzes how luxury status may influence this relationship. 
Technology systems are prone to failures, and it is well-established that luxury vehicles today 
have more advanced technology than their non-luxury counterparts (Jayaraman, 2013; Partridge, 
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2011; Rijpma, 1997). Since it is difficult to categorize each vehicle on a scale based on the 
technologies it includes without subjective bias, this thesis will attempt to quantify the effect of 
technology by analyzing penetration of multiple technology options in vehicles; including 
navigation systems, stability control, and side airbags. These three options were chosen because 
they represent separate areas of vehicle technology: software (stability control), mechanical (side 
airbags), and experiential/non-critical (navigation systems). Technology option data are gathered 
from Ward’s automotive for 2003-2011 US-produced sedans. I will test the effect of these on 
recalls as well as how luxury status moderates this relationship using a panel regression model. 
Current research has focused on different realms of vehicle data. Studies have examined 
how plant-level data, component-level data, and the variety of components in cars influence 
quality and recalls (Bray, Serpa, & Colak, 2016; Shah et al., 2013). This study opens a new area 
of research, as it is the first to examine technology options’ relationship with recalls. 
The results of this study are intensely relevant to consumers and auto manufacturers. The 
results may upend the traditional assumption that newer and luxury cars are of higher quality, 
and consumers may demand that all vehicles become more reliable. This has happened in the 
past with chip manufacturers—high-quality Japanese chips flooded the market, and consumers 
demanded better quality from all manufacturers (Garvin, 1987). Higher technology quality could 
result in fewer recalls and potentially fewer consumer fatalities from failures. Vehicle brands 
may also take notice and look at ways to decrease recall rates by retooling their IT initiatives or 
by speeding up IT talent acquisition. Since recalls cost an estimated $20 million each, 
automakers surely would seek to minimize any negative effects their technologies have (Shah et 
al., 2013). 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section two includes a literature review of 
consumer perceptions of luxury goods, the failure potential of technology, vehicle recall rates, 
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and hypothesis development. In section three, I will describe my data collection and analysis 
methods. In section four, I will describe the main variables, the analysis method, and its 
appropriateness. In section five, I will report the main results of my method, and in section six I 
will discuss the implications of my findings, limitations, and implications for future research. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.0 Introduction 
This literature review section is divided into three subsections, and the first section 
analyzes the inherent problems that accompany technological pursuits. The second section 
discusses the incidence of vehicle recalls over time, and the reasoning behind my first 
hypothesis. The final section shines light upon how current research supports the notion that 
luxury goods are perceived to be higher quality items, and the reasoning behind my second 
hypothesis. I intend to connect the problems of technology directly to vehicle recalls, and I will 
also examine how luxury status may moderate this relationship. 
2.1 Failure of Technology 
Technology presents the risk for dramatic failure. As automakers increase the technology 
components of their cars, they expose their customers and themselves to more risk (Kwiecinska, 
2010). Although technological systems can work more efficiently, the specter of failure is nearly 
always present.  
This is shown in Normal Accidents Theory, and the theory states that systems with 
increasing complexity and tight-coupling have increasing chances of failure (Rijpma, 1997). In 
the theory, complexity is likely in a system where components have many functions, where 
components are close to each other, and in systems that have some sort of reasoning and 
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calculation (Rijpma, 1997). Tight-coupling is likely in a system with repeated and time-
dependent processes, with inputs that cannot be substituted, where safety devices are included, 
and where improvising is impossible (Rijpma, 1997). These characteristics describe a typical 
vehicle’s technology systems.  
With technology, mistakes that would have been trivial in the past have now become fatal 
(Chiles, 2001). This is especially true with automotive systems. If a stability control system fails, 
a driver could potentially lose control of their car and crash, which happened to both Audi and 
Mercedes-Benz (Williams, 2004). Clearly the consequences of automotive technology failures 
can be fatal. Others agree with Normal Accidents Theory and Chiles’s findings, and add that 
“hidden or apparently minor design errors” may surface in these systems as well (Dumas, 2002, 
p. 281). Dumas adds that, for the most crucial technologies that humans possess, the best way to 
solve issues is to learn from mistakes (2002, p. 281). For technologies that can create destruction, 
however, perfection is critical. Despite this, Chiles finds that perfection can only be truly attained 
when the system is off (2001). It has also been shown that complex vehicle components can have 
failure rates 4.9 times higher than typical, average components, and that same, albeit less strong, 
relationship holds for new components (Bray et al., 2016).  
The problems rooted in technology are far deeper than hardware or software failure. 
These are created by humans, and they are a product of human nature. Partridge (2011) writes 
that “Nothing is easier, and more difficult to resist, than creating a program that is totally beyond 
the programmer’s conceptual grasp” (p. 10). Mercedes-Benz’s MAGIC BODY CONTROL 
seems precisely like a system that is too complex for a human to understand it (Armstead, 2013). 
Possibly due in part to this conceptual disconnect and the standard practice of having multiple 
coders contribute to a single project, Partridge finds that “conventional IT system construction is 
excessively fragile” (2011, p. 300). It should be noted that, though Normal Accidents Theory 
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bodes poorly for technology systems, it has a counterpart in High Reliability Theory. High 
Reliability Theory involves using organizational strategies to deal with complex systems, and the 
Theory proves to be a counterweight to Chiles’s arguments (Rijpma, 1997). 
Vehicles today involve ample numbers of technology applications and software code, and 
assessing the role of technology failure in vehicles is an important area to examine (Jayaraman, 
2013). This is especially important considering that current studies have focused on how the 
variety of components in cars, plant-level data, or even component-level data influence quality 
and recalls (Bray et al., 2016; Shah et al., 2013). This study is the first to examine technology 
options, and it seeks to determine the effect on recalls when technology options are applied in 
vehicles. 
2.2 Vehicle Recalls 
Vehicle recalls have been increasing in number as the number of vehicles on the road 
increases over time (Bates, Holweg, Lewis, and Oliver, 2007). This seems to be a natural 
conclusion. Because vehicle recalls have always occurred, when more vehicles are sold, more 
vehicles will be recalled. Bates et al. (2007) was able to find that the number of recall incidents 
have shown a two-to-threefold increase in quantity over 1992-2002. US data support these 
findings as well. In 1966, there were 58 recalls; in 2000, there were 631; in 2008, there were 
nearly 800 (Ahsan, 2013). Ahsan (2013) finds that “the number of automobile recalls in the US 
has increased sharply in the last two decades” (p. 5). However, while incidences of recalls are 
increasing, recalls per vehicle manufactured is not. In the UK, when recalls are normalized 
against vehicle registration data, there is no positive or negative correlation that can be found 
concerning recall rates over time (Bates, et al., 2007). This means that manufacturers are not 
getting better nor worse at preventing recalls—they are steady over time. This could be attributed 
to many things: higher quality being dragged down by higher volume, complexities of 
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manufacturing at plants around the world, or recurring problems associated with the 
technological options in the vehicles. Interestingly, it is estimated that 60 to 70 percent of vehicle 
recalls in developed markets such as the US and Europe are due to software issues, and Audi and 
Mercedes-Benz have learned that software quality is necessary (Jayaraman, 2013; Williams, 
2004). This study intends to quantify the effect of technology on vehicle recalls. 
2.3 Hypothesis 1 
Technology in vehicles has only been recently implemented, and “most innovation in the 
design of motor vehicles stems from the development of electronics” (Hines, 2013). Due to the 
rapid advances in technology in past decades, it is natural to assume that older vehicles do not 
widely use the technologies present in newer vehicles. Navigation systems, stability control 
systems, and even side airbags are options in today’s new vehicles that had low adoption rates in 
the past. These features have increased in penetration over the last two decades, and it is intuitive 
to think that vehicles today incorporate significantly more technology options than vehicles in 
the past. I have sought to establish that with technology comes at a cost, and technology 
problems are now owners’ top complaints about their cars. (Dumas, 2002; Jensen, 2016; 
Partridge, 2011). Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Technology option penetration is positively associated with recalls. 
2.4 “Luxury” As a Quality Dimension 
Luxury goods are premium products whose companies seek to differentiate them from 
typical non-luxury goods. The premium aspect with luxury goods also brings a higher price than 
regular goods. The psychology behind luxury consumers is often studied, and it has been shown 
that luxury is a subjective concept that depends entirely on context (Walley, Custance, Copley, & 
Perry, 2013). Walley et al. identified five main dimensions of a luxury consumer and found that 
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luxury consumers typically have Affect, Characteristics, Status, Gifting, and Involvement 
dimensions (2013, p. 831). The Affect dimension had a strong association with the statement that 
“Luxury brands are of a higher quality than non luxury brands” (Walley et al. 2013, p. 829). This 
belief in the quality of luxury goods appears to hold despite cultural differences as well. Chinese 
consumers from overwhelmingly agreed in a study that luxury goods are, in general, better 
quality products (Wang, Sun, and Song 2011). Chinese consumers also agree in other statements 
that luxury goods are of higher quality, luxuries are worth the money, and luxuries are detail-
oriented (Wang et al. 2011, p. 352). The belief in the quality of luxury goods appears to remain 
in China even though “Chinese luxury consumers are likely to focus more on external social 
needs than on internal individual needs” (Wang, et al. 2011, p. 348).  
It is also noteworthy that two of Garvin’s eight dimensions of quality are reliability and 
perceived quality (Garvin, 1987). Garvin notes that quality dimensions often interact with each 
other, and he notes that Honda initially chose to tell consumers that some Hondas were made in 
America; instead, they preferred consumers to perceive them as higher-quality, 100% Japanese 
cars (Garvin, 1987). This applies to luxury cars because, since their perceived quality is higher, 
consumers likely expect higher reliability as well. It is clear that past studies show that 
consumers believe that luxury goods are of higher quality, so it is likely that these beliefs hold 
for luxury vehicles.  
Given the notion of higher quality, it is possible that luxury status buffers a vehicle from 
technology failure. However, Bray, Serpa, and Colak (2016), in their study of supply chain 
distance’s effect on component failure rates, found that luxury vehicle components are 2.84 
times more sensitive to supplier geographic distance. This may imply that luxury components 
have higher failure rates. For example, Audi and Mercedes-Benz proved victims of stability 
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control software recalls in the late 1990s (Williams, 2004). Empirically, it is essential to evaluate 
the relationship between luxury status, technology, and recall rates. 
2.5 Hypothesis 2 
The inherent failures of technology and higher levels of technology in luxury vehicles 
imply that luxury vehicles will have more issues with technology, and, as a result, more recalls. 
Despite this assumption, luxury vehicles are viewed by consumers as possessing a higher level of 
quality (Galloway, 2010; Walley, Custance, Copley, & Perry, 2013; Wang et al., 2011). 
Literature regarding technological failures, such as Normal Accidents Theory, is more 
compelling than fickle consumer expectations of luxury cars. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Luxury status moderates the relationship between technology option 
penetration and recalls. 
To summarize, technology problems are seemingly unavoidable, even when following 
best practices, due to human nature and the complexity of IT systems. Furthermore, while recalls 
per vehicle manufactured may not be increasing, the number of vehicles and incidences of 
vehicle recalls have been steadily increasing over time. Lastly, consumers view luxury goods as 
higher quality across cultures and personality types. Current research fails to combine these areas 
and discover the effect of technology in vehicles and its effect on recall rates and how luxury 
status moderates this relationship. Luxury vehicles, which are perceived to have the highest 
quality, also make extensive use of technology, which is associated with numerous problems. 
Luxury vehicles can have as many as 100 million lines of code while non-luxury vehicles have 
typically 20 to 30 million lines (Jayaraman, 2013).  
Current studies have not focused on technology options in vehicles, and this study does 
(Bray et al., 2016; Shah et al., 2013). This research seeks to connect technology, luxury, and 
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recalls and study the impact of technology options in vehicles and how that impact changes in 
luxury vehicle applications. Hypothesis 1 seeks to understand the effect of new technological 
options on vehicle recalls, and Hypothesis 2 seeks to see how the luxury dimension alters that 
relationship between the two variables. 
Data and Methods 
3.1 Data Sample 
My dataset comes from a combination of Ward’s Automotive, a leading automotive 
research company, and a past study done by Shah, Ball, & Netessine (2013). These data were 
used successfully in their study, and this study also slightly improves on their dataset. Shah, Ball, 
& Netessine used seven model years: 2000-2006 (2013). However, my study uses nine model 
years: 2003-2011. I used these model years to achieve the highest amount of technology option 
penetration possible while balancing the lack of recalls typically associated with extremely 
recent model years. I also expanded the dataset to provide more accuracy through more 
observations over time.  
All recall data was accessed from the NHTSA website; these data are government-created 
and therefore a reliable source. I accessed vehicle recall data in November 2016 for the 2003-
2011 model years. In the study, a vehicle model year averages 3.77 recalls over its lifetime and 
has a standard deviation of 3.4 recalls. 
My dataset contains all US-manufactured sedans from model years 2003-2011. The data 
contain 10 manufacturers (Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Mazda, Mitsubishi, 
Nissan, Toyota, and Volkswagen), and there are 83 different vehicle models. There are 409 
model year observations. 
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I analyze my data at a model year level to account for differing levels of technology 
options for each model year. This structure also allows for specific model year recalls to be 
allocated back to the vehicle that created them. For instance, a manufacturer could have a recall 
related to a single vehicle’s model year, and this study allows for that recall to be allocated to 
that vehicle’s model year. The structure also allows for a more direct relationship between 
technology option penetration and the recalls associated with a vehicle.  
3.2 Dependent Variable: Recall Count 
 The dependent variable used in my analysis is the count of recalls for a specific model in 
a given model year, which I call “recall count.” For example, the 2006 Chrysler 300 has had 5 
recalls over its lifetime. The recall count variable would be 5 for that model. All recalls, no 
matter when they occurred, are brought back to the vehicle model year they originated from. Out 
of 409 observations, 66 have a recall count of 0. This is noteworthy, as over 16% of vehicles had 
no recalls. The recall count data exhibit heavy skew and have many outliers. Because of this, in 
the study, recall count is maxed at a value of 7. This still accounts for 90% of all model years. 
 If recall count were not altered, the results of this study would be invalid. The model 
would be heavily skewed by the number of extreme outliers in the data. For example, only 18 out 
of the data’s 409 model year observations have over 10 recalls, and one model year has 22 
recalls. These outliers do not explain the vast majority of vehicle recalls and may skew the 
model, so I capped their recall count at a value of 7. In total, 44 model years are affected by this 
recall cap. 
3.3 Independent Variables: Stability Control, Navigation Systems, Side Airbags 
 There are three independent variables in my study: stability control, navigation systems, 
and side airbags. This is unique to my study, and these three have not been used as proxies for 
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technology before. These variables are again associated with a specific model in a given model 
year, and they are percentages to reflect the penetration of the option. I measure penetration 
because this best fits my hypotheses. If an automaker has higher penetration of an option 
instance, according to my first hypothesis, this should provide more opportunity for failure under 
Normal Accidents Theory and result in higher recalls. To further explain how penetration is 
measured, if 33.4% of 2004 Chrysler 300s had a navigation systems installed, the navigation 
systems variable for that model would be .334. I chose these three options from different 
technological areas to gain a more holistic view about how technology options affect a car’s 
recall rate. Stability control is a software-based option, navigation systems are an experiential, 
non-critical technology, and side airbags are a more mechanical, design-related technology. 
Stability control. This is a safety technology option that is integrated into a vehicle’s software 
and controls vehicle braking responses when the vehicle loses traction. It is not currently 
required for US vehicles, but it was proposed as a requirement and was quickly made standard 
by many automakers (Valdes-Dapena, 2006). Stability control had nearly universal adoption by 
the end of our study’s observed years. In the study, stability control has an average penetration 
rate of 34% and a standard deviation of 43.73%. 
Navigation systems. This is far different from the other options. It is a luxurious, experiential 
technology option in a car. It had nearly zero adoption at the beginning of the study and amassed 
only small adoption rates by the end of the study; this is likely a reflection of its high expense 
and luxuriousness. In the study, navigation systems has an average penetration rate of 9.3% with 
a standard deviation of 19%. 
Side airbags. Finally, I chose side airbags as an option to reflect a complex, mechanical 
technology in a car. Side airbags are a type of technology that has to be incorporated into a 
vehicle’s design, so I felt this variable reflects a different aspect of vehicle technology. Adoption 
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for side airbags was low at the beginning of our study and neared 100% at the end. In the study, 
side airbags has an average penetration rate of 61.9% with a standard deviation of 44.3%. 
3.4 Control Variables: Years Since Launch, Manufacturer, Luxury, Model Year, Volume 
I use five control variables in this study: years since launch, manufacturer, luxury, model 
year, and volume. 
Years since launch. I incorporate this variable to account for the fact that a newer model may be 
more likely to experience a recall. This control variable is identical to that present in past studies, 
so the data were obtained from them (Shah et al., 2013). 
Manufacturer. These dummy variables are created to account for systematic differences in 
recall rates across companies. 
Luxury. A dummy luxury variable was created from Ward’s data that classified vehicles as 
luxury or non-luxury. Examples of luxury vehicles according to Ward’s are the Chrysler 300, 
Chevrolet Corvette, and Acura TL. Luxury vehicles are lower-volume and have a perceived 
higher quality, so this allows the study to control for any effects of luxury vehicles.  
Model year. Dummy variables are used to account for the fact that recalls may vary by each 
year. 
Volume. Finally, I used the natural logarithm on volume (ln volume) to account for scale when 
producing a specific vehicle model. 
3.5 Exploratory Data Analysis 
Figure 1 shows that the recall count variable has an extreme negative binomial 
distribution. The outliers on the graph are far from the median recall instances, and they are not 
representative of the true number of recalls per vehicle. 89.24% of all model years have 7 or 
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fewer recalls; therefore, I created an adjusted recall count variable that caps recall instances per 
model year at 7. This prevents the data from being skewed by the larger number of 10 recall 
instances. This adjustment of the dependent variable allows for regression models to more 
accurately fit the data, and it decreases the need for a negative binomial model. 
Recall incidents per year can be found in Figure 2. The distribution is fairly constant, and 
it interestingly shows a decrease in total vehicles affected by recalls as time passes. This differs 
from recent studies, but it is likely due to the fact that this dataset is limited only to US-produced 
sedans. It is noteworthy that recalls would be so stable over such a long time period, and it may 
suggest that automakers continue to struggle with the dependability of new models. 
All three key independent variables of interest show increasing adoption over time. 
Stability control shows the sharpest rate of adoption, and side airbags show the steadiest rate of 
adoption and end in 2011 at nearly 100% adoption. Navigation systems are non-safety-related 
and largely experiential: their adoption rate increases over time but never reaches 20% of new 
cars. The graphs of technology variable adoption over time as well as adoption for luxury cars 
can be seen in Figure 3. 
Table 4 shows all variables and basic statistics such as mean, maximum, and standard 
deviation. It is worthwhile to note that, since the independent variables reflect technology 
complexity, that they are highly correlated with each other. A correlation matrix of all variables 
can be found in Table 5. 
3.6 Empirical Approach 
I run a panel regression to test my first hypothesis with the dependent variable recall 
count. Hypothesis 1 is supported if the p-value of any of my independent variables is under .05. 
For my second hypothesis, I run a panel regression with three interaction terms, and the terms are 
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stability control*luxury, navigation systems*luxury, and side airbag*luxury. Hypothesis 2 is 
supported if the p-value of any interaction term is under .05. 
A panel regression is a simple regression model that follows a group of individuals over 
time. Panel regressions are ideal for longitudinal datasets that provide observations from a group 
of individuals over time, and panel regressions are often used on economic-related data like that 
of employment and income studies (Hsiao, 2004). When data are structured in a panel, it is 
natural to use a panel regression to evaluate them. The two major types of panel regression are 
fixed effects or random effects regressions, and fixed effects regressions are used when trying to 
control for an individual’s effect on the outcome variable. A random effects model assumes 
variation across individuals is uncorrelated and random. A fixed effects regression may be better 
used when some variable, say manufacturer skill, is assumed to consistently affect results and 
needs to be controlled. A random effects model is better for when it is assumed that variations 
across individuals are not correlated with the independent variable used in the model. A random 
effects model also allows results to be generalized to a larger population. Panel data are not ideal 
for using on data that are serially correlated, as the presence of serial correlation may create 
statistical significance where there is none. 
A panel regression is used because it identifies that, for instance, a 2002 Chrysler 300 and 
a 2003 Chrysler 300 are inherently related, and it prevents these relationships from confounding 
the regression. Instead, the panel regression will search across models and look for relationships 
between different models over time. This panel regression also is a random effects model, which 
means that it assumes individuals that have unique attributes are the result of random variation. 
Panel regressions are strong with panel data and when using random effects or fixed 
effects models. However, panels struggle with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in data, 
and other models may be better used with panels that exhibit these characteristics. For my study, 
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the random effects panel model I use fits the data well, and, since there is no cross-sectional 
dependence, heteroskedasticity is not a concern. However, it should be noted that my data are 
serially correlated, and the panel regression model does not account for this. 
I also consider several alternative methods to a panel regression. They are a negative 
binomial panel regression, a panel regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, and a 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) panel regression as used by Shah, Ball, and Netessine in 
their automotive study (2013). I choose not to use the negative binomial regression because I 
manually alter the dependent variable to negate its negative binomial distribution. The Driscoll-
Kraay panel that accounts for serial correlation is a promising model, and its results are similar to 
the panel regression’s results. I chose to report results from the panel regression because it is a 
simpler model. Finally, I do not use a GEE panel for the same reason: the results are similar 
enough to the simple panel regression that there seems to be little value in using a more complex 
model.  
Results 
4.1 Regression Results 
Table 6 shows my main regression results in the panel regression column and several 
control variables are significant. The year 2008 has a coefficient that is strongly negative at -0.78 
(p-value .04). Next, years since launch’s coefficient is a mild -0.02 (p-value .07). Finally, 
volume’s coefficient is 0.40 (p-value .001). 
The beta for the regression is 0.91 with a standard error of 2.36. When all independent 
variables are tested in tandem, navigation system adoption is the only significant variable. and it 
has a strongly negative coefficient of -2.33 (p-value .01). These results directly contradict 
hypothesis 1b and provides no support for hypotheses 1a and 1c. Interestingly, stability control 
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has a coefficient of 0.65 (p-value .06), which is the opposite of navigation systems. This may 
suggest that peripheral technologies relate to fewer recalls and software-based technologies may 
relate to more recalls. 
4.2 Interaction Regression Results 
Table 7 shows my results for hypothesis 2, and Figure 8 contains graphs of the variable 
interactions. Control variable coefficients change slightly in this model, but all stay at the same 
level of significance. When tested, the luxury*stability control has a coefficient of -1.05 (p-value 
.04), and the luxury*side airbag has a coefficient of -1.72 (p-value .004). Luxury*navigation 
systems is insignificant and has a coefficient of -2.00 (p-value .28). Because two out of three 
terms are significant, this provides some support for hypothesis 2. In two cases, the luxury 
dimension changes the effects of technology on recalls in a negative way. All three interaction 
terms have a negative coefficient, and two of these cases are significant. 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
I conducted four robustness checks on hypothesis 1 to evaluate my panel regression’s 
performance. All robustness checks can be found in Table 9. 
I chose to use another panel regression equipped with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
(xtscc function in Stata). Through use of Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, this model robustly 
accounts for serial correlation by using standard errors that allow for more than first-order 
autocorrelation between results. All results remain the same as with the panel regression; 
however, coefficients and results become more significant. The beta of this model is -3.22 and is 
significant (p-value .05). The standard error of the model is 1.62. The years 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, and 2011 now hold the highest significance (p-values .000), and their coefficients are -
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2.45, 0.31, 0.51, 0.37, and 2.11, respectively. Another area of note is the automaker control 
variables. Ford is insignificant with a coefficient of -1.86 (p-value .052), Mazda is significant 
with a coefficient of 2.11 (p-value .02), Volkswagen has a coefficient of -1.56 (p-value .04), and 
Mitsubishi is insignificant with a coefficient of -1.53 (p-value .07). Furthermore, the luxury 
dimension is now significant and a has coefficient of 0.72 (p-value .02), which points to higher 
recalls among luxury cars. This may be because serial correlation in the data are masking 
significant results, and the Driscoll-Kraay model adequately accounts for them. Though this 
model’s results have lower p-values and stronger coefficients than the original, none of its results 
conflict with the simple panel. Therefore, this model largely confirms the results provided by the 
panel regression. 
My second check is a simple first-order autocorrelation panel regression (xtregar function 
in Stata). Since this model only accounts for first-order autocorrelation, it accounts for it less 
robustly than the Driscoll-Kraay model. This model has a constant of 1.12 and a standard error of 
2.20.  Differences in results when compared to the panel regression are minimal. Navigation 
systems still is significant (p-value .01), and its coefficient strengthens to -2.35. The same 
happens for the year 2008 (p-value .04), and its coefficient changes to -0.82. The year 2009 
changes from the original panel, and now has a stronger coefficient of -0.76 (p-value .08). 
Interestingly, the stability control variable becomes insignificant and its coefficient changes to 
0.50 (p-value .14). Finally, volume’s coefficient stays the same at 0.40 (p-value .001). These 
results coupled with the Driscoll-Kraay panel are telling, as this model seems to occupy the 
middle ground between the original panel and the Driscoll-Kraay panel. Perhaps this may reflect 
that autocorrelation in the data may be obscuring actual relationships.  
Because the recall count variable has a subtle, residual negative binomial distribution 
even after adjusting for recall count, I also choose to use a negative binomial panel regression to 
20 
 
 
examine it. This model has a constant of 15.93 and a standard error of 274.43, so its results may 
be flawed. Despite this, it is noteworthy that navigation systems is more significant and has a 
coefficient of -1.25 (p-value .004). Stability control maintains its significance and its coefficient 
changes to 0.24 (p-value .07). The year 2008 loses significance, and its coefficient changes to -
0.20 (p-value .16). Finally, volume’s coefficient becomes 0.16 (p-value .003). Interestingly, the 
model seems only to drive coefficients closer to zero. This could be due to the fact that I have 
altered the recall count variable, or it could reflect that there are simply fewer recalls in later 
years of the study. 
Finally, as Shah, Ball, and Netessine (2013) have done, I use a Generalized Estimating 
Equation. GEE allows the dependent variable to be randomly distributed, and it also allows for 
the dependent variable to be clustered. This is somewhat helpful for my data, as recall counts are 
slightly clustered near lower recall counts. Shah, Ball, and Netessine also note that the GEE 
equation has been used to great success in past research when dependent variables often equal 
zero (2013). It has also been used successfully in multiple past studies (Rhee & Haunschild, 
2006; Shah et al., 2013; Sine, Shane, & Gregorio, 2003; Wowak, Mannor, & Wowak, 2015). The 
GEE model largely confirms the results of my simple panel regression, and it has a constant of 
0.25 with a standard error of 2.11. Stability control maintains its significance, and its constant 
changes slightly to 0.64 (p-value .07). Navigation systems’ constant changes to -2.39 (p-value 
.008). Interestingly, the year 2008 loses significance, and its coefficient moves toward zero and 
becomes -0.67 (p-value .08). Finally, volume’s coefficient gets stronger and becomes 0.45 (p-
value .000). 
Discussion 
The results show mixed support for my assertion that stability control, navigation 
systems, and side airbags increase recalls and that luxury status moderates this relationship. 
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However, three important findings emerged. First, despite the negative relationship between 
navigation systems and recalls, there is inconsistent evidence that technology options on 
aggregate are associated with positive or negative recalls. Secondly, it appears that technology 
applications in luxury vehicles are associated with a reduction in recalls. Luxury status appears 
to mask the bifurcated relationship between technology and recalls in luxury and non-luxury cars 
for stability control and side airbags. Finally, contrary to popular beliefs about quality, it appears 
that luxury vehicles do not have significantly fewer recalls than non-luxury vehicles. In this 
section, I will expand upon my findings for technology and recalls, and, next, I will discuss the 
implications of luxury’s moderation of this relationship. Finally, I will discuss the surprising 
absence of a significant relationship between luxury status and recalls. 
5.1 Technology and Recalls 
 The data do not show particularly compelling evidence for the assertion that aggregate 
technology options positively affect recalls. Stability control and side airbags are not statistically 
significant, and navigation systems is significant in a negative way. The negative effects of 
navigation systems directly contradict my hypothesis that navigation systems would be related to 
an increase in recalls. 
 However, navigation systems and stability control remain areas of interest. I classified 
navigation systems as a peripheral technology, and the option showed a strong negative 
correlation with recalls. Since it can be argued that cars with expensive, experiential navigation 
systems typically have other options installed, perhaps this may indicate that more highly 
optioned vehicles have lower recall rates. These lower recall rates could potentially be from 
more time being spent in assembly or design to account for the complexity of the options. This 
same effect was confirmed in the test of luxury’s moderation of the relationship between 
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technology and recalls, and stability control and side airbags in luxury cars predicted fewer 
recalls. The same results did not hold for navigation systems, which may be a reflection that the 
navigation systems option has a stronger aggregate association with negative recalls than an 
association on the more granular, class level. 
Conversely, stability control is not significant in the main regression but has a p-value 
under .10, and it has a positive correlation with recalls. Stability control is a complex, software-
based option. Although a software option was not significant in this study, it may be worth 
examining in future studies the effect of software technologies on vehicle recall rates—especially 
considering that automakers have been proven to struggle with them (Williams, 2004). Stability 
control’s results may be explained by the rapid adoption of the technology over the sample. As 
automakers implemented the system when it was rumored to be mandated, they may have been 
rushed. This could have led to more errors and the results shown in the data. 
5.2 Luxury’s Moderation of Technology and Recalls 
It is noteworthy that stability control in non-luxury vehicles positively relates to recalls, 
as it is a software-based option and possibly has more opportunity for failure due to its 
complexity. 
Interestingly, the luxury dimension is shown to be negatively related to recalls for 
vehicles equipped with stability control and side airbags but not navigation systems. The 
interaction term results are significant, whereas the panel results are not. This may indicate that 
technologies in luxury vehicles decrease recalls, which fits consumer perceptions of luxury 
vehicles.  
Luxury vehicles tend to introduce new technologies and contain up to five times the 
amount of software code, so the results are surprising (Jayaraman, 2013). This seems to directly 
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contradict the Normal Accidents Theory and favor High Reliability Theory (Rijpma, 1997). It is 
highly plausible that theory that luxury vehicle manufacturers follow the core tenets of High 
Reliability Theory, which are using redundancy, decentralizing decision making, and using 
multiple theories and processes at the same time to manage technology options (Rijpma, 1997). 
This may lead luxury vehicle manufacturers to place more emphasis on luxury vehicle 
technology applications and relate to a subsequent decrease in recalls. This would support what 
the data show. 
Another area of note is navigation systems. As it was argued previously, cars with 
navigation systems likely cost more and have more complexity. This may point to an underlying 
variable, such as option density or even the MSRP of the car, that accounts for this relationship. 
It may be that vehicles that have more options and/or cost more have more effort put into their 
manufacture and have lower recalls as a result. 
Finally, it is unexpected that stability control differs so markedly when applied in luxury 
vehicles versus non-luxury vehicles. Perhaps this is again a reflection of High Reliability Theory 
and the extra effort put into luxury vehicles. Stability control is the only option to show such a 
strong difference between vehicle classes, and it may allude to the instability of software. Since 
software issues represent 60 to 70 percent of vehicle recalls in major automotive markets, it is 
plausible that software applications in non-luxury vehicles are more unstable because due 
diligence was not performed to the same standard as in the luxury application (Jayaraman, 2013). 
5.3 Luxury Status and Recalls 
Only one model shows luxury status to have a significant relationship with recalls—the 
Driscoll-Kraay robustness check. Interestingly, the Driscoll-Kraay model found luxury status 
positively associated with recalls. I have posited that this model may best expose the underlying 
relationships due to its accounting for autocorrelation, and it is highly surprising that it would 
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unveil a positive relationship between luxury and recalls. However, all other models find that 
luxury status has no significant relationship with recalls; therefore, it is unlikely that a significant 
relationship exists. This in itself is surprising—especially given the fact that technology options 
in luxury cars predict fewer recalls.  
Given that consumers expect luxury vehicles to be higher quality, it is interesting to find 
that luxury vehicles have no significant results with recalls. This could be because there are 
multitudes of factors affecting luxury, and they confound each other and prevent any clear 
relationship between luxury status and recalls to emerge. It also could be a reflection of the 
inherent difficulties automakers face when producing vehicles. It is as if Normal Accidents 
Theory is true for luxury automakers on an aggregate level. Despite their successes at managing 
issues like the effects of technology options on recalls, it is likely far more challenging to 
manage the quality of an entire vehicle, and the results exemplify this. 
Conclusion 
This study makes multiple contributions to current academic literature, and it is of great 
value to the automotive industry and consumers. To my knowledge, this study is the first to 
examine the effect of technology options on recall rates, which is a completely new area of 
study. Furthermore, the results of this study may sway buyer behavior and change manufacturer 
behaviors with technology. Insights from the study could also prevent future fatalities related to 
vehicle technologies. This thesis has answered what effect technology has on recall rates and 
how luxury status influences this relationship. 
6.1 Limitations of Study 
The study does present several limitations, with the largest being the use of only three 
technology options to predict recalls. Technologies in cars can vary from mechanical 
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(suspension) to software-based (blind-spot warning systems) to peripheral (navigation systems). 
It is clear that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of technologies that this study does not 
examine. An ideal situation would be the creation of a new variable that fully measures the 
technological capability of a car. A standardized “technology index” would be made for each 
vehicle, and recalls would be predicted from that. Unfortunately, this was beyond the scope of 
my current project though it leaves promising potential for future research. 
Another limitation is the sample itself: US-manufactured sedans from 2003-2011 is a 
large sample but far from representative of all US vehicles. This limitation was created by 
differences in data reporting between the SUV, sedan, and imported vehicle segments. Since this 
study is lacking a true random sample, the results from the panel regression may not hold true 
across the entire population (Woodridge, 2010). This could possibly explain some conflicting 
results of the data. 
The final notable limitation is the autocorrelation present within the data. Ideally, the data 
would have no autocorrelation, but it is inherent when measuring technology options over time. 
To account for this, I used two autocorrelation panel robustness checks, and the results from 
those models largely confirmed my results. Therefore, I believe this limitation has been 
satisfactorily addressed. 
6.2 Implications for Future Research 
 This study has its limitations, but it provides opportunities and a solid foundation from 
which future research may continue. First, it has provided preliminary insight into technology 
option variables, and it has highlighted a need for a standardized technology index. Such an 
index would allow for a much more robust measure of technology’s effect on recalls. Secondly, 
it has shown the necessity for further control variables. Some results of this study are conflicting, 
and it is likely that some other factors are affecting recall rates. Manufacturing data such as 
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location of vehicle manufacture, number of vehicles per manufacturing line, and number of lines 
used per vehicle are all absent from my study—these could have a large effect in future research. 
Furthermore, as previously noted, the sample in this study was confined to a small subset of all 
vehicles. Perhaps future research could use a sample across developed countries and all vehicle 
body styles. 
As technology and vehicles continue to increase in frequency, researching their effects on 
vehicle recalls is crucial. This study, despite its limitations, has contributed to academic literature 
by analyzing technology options as a new area of study, and it provides a framework for future 
research on technology applications in vehicles.  
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Figure 1: Recall Count Frequency Distribution 
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Figure 2: Recalls by Year and Manufacturer 
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Figure 3: Option Adoption by Year and Luxury Status (0 is non-luxury, 1 is luxury) 
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Table	4:	Description	of	Variables	and	Summary	Statistics	
Variable Description Minimum Maximum Mean Standard	Deviation
Recalls Number	of	product	recalls	per	model	per	year 0 22 3.77 3.40
Stability	Control Percent	of	vehicles	equipped	with	stability	control 0 1 0.34 0.44
Navigation	Systems Percent	of	vehicles	equipped	with	navigation	system 0 1 0.09 0.19
Side	Airbags Percent	of	vehicles	equipped	with	side	airbags 0 1 0.62 0.44
Years	Since	Launch Number	of	years	since	original	model	launch	year 0 58 17.04 15.63
Volume Number	of	cars	sold	in	model-year 19 485,370 103,796 101,979
Luxury Luxury	status 0 1 0.27 0.44
GM Manufactured	by	GM 0 1 0.35 0.48
Toyota Manufactured	by	Toyota 0 1 0.10 0.30
Honda Manufactured	by	Honda 0 1 0.07 0.25
Ford Manufactured	by	Ford 0 1 0.21 0.41
Chrysler Manufactured	by	Chrysler 0 1 0.12 0.33
Nissan Manufactured	by	Nissan 0 1 0.05 0.23
Mazda Manufactured	by	Mazda 0 1 0.02 0.15
Volkswagen Manufactured	by	Volkswagen 0 1 0.02 0.15
Mitsubishi Manufactured	by	Mitsubishi 0 1 0.04 0.21
Hyundai Manufactured	by	Hyundai 0 1 0.01 0.11
2003 2003	model-year 0 1 0.11 0.31
2004 2004	model-year 0 1 0.11 0.31
2005 2005	model-year 0 1 0.11 0.31
2006 2006	model-year 0 1 0.08 0.28
2007 2007	model-year 0 1 0.13 0.33
2008 2008	model-year 0 1 0.12 0.33
2009 2009	model-year 0 1 0.13 0.33
2010 2010	model-year 0 1 0.12 0.32
2011 2011	model-year 0 1 0.11 0.31
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Table	6:	Panel	Regression	Results—Recall	Count	
		 		 		 		 		 		
		 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Stability	Control	 	 0.45	 	  0.65+	
	
 (0.34)	 	  (0.34)	
Navigation	System	 	  -2.00*	 	 -2.33*	
	   (0.92)	 	 (0.94)	
Side	Airbag	 	   -0.26	 -0.27	
	    (0.32)	 (0.31)	
Volume	 0.45***	 0.43***	 0.43***	 0.45***	 0.40**	
	 (0.12)	 (0.12)	 (0.12)	 (0.12)	 (0.12)	
Years	Since	Launch	 -0.02+	 -0.02	 -0.03*	 -0.02+	 -0.02+	
	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	
2003	 -2.74	 -2.71	 -3.05	 -2.81	 -3.14	
	 (2.28)	 (2.28)	 (2.27)	 (2.29)	 (2.28)	
2004	 0.14	 0.12	 0.18	 0.15	 0.18	
	 (0.33)	 (0.33)	 (0.33)	 (0.33)	 (0.33)	
2005	 0.20	 0.17	 0.27	 0.24	 0.27	
	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	
2006	 -0.17	 -0.21	 -0.08	 -0.11	 -0.07	
	 (0.37)	 (0.37)	 (0.37)	 (0.38)	 (0.37)	
2007	 -0.40	 -0.44	 -0.28	 -0.30	 -0.22	
	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.36)	 (0.36)	
2008	 -0.98**	 -1.06**	 -0.82*	 -0.85*	 -0.78*	
	 (0.34)	 (0.35)	 (0.35)	 (0.38)	 (0.38)	
2009	 -0.78*	 -0.95*	 -0.61+	 -0.63	 -0.68	
	 (0.36)	 (0.38)	 (0.37)	 (0.41)	 (0.42)	
2010	 -0.54	 -0.86*	 -0.34	 -0.37	 -0.59	
	 (0.37)	 (0.44)	 (0.38)	 (0.42)	 (0.48)	
2011	 1.83	 1.44	 2.42	 2.08	 2.20	
	 (2.28)	 (2.30)	 (2.28)	 (2.30)	 (2.32)	
Luxury	 -0.27	 -0.41	 0.13	 -0.19	 0.08	
	 (0.51)	 (0.52)	 (0.54)	 (0.52)	 (0.56)	
Chrysler	 -1.32	 -1.07	 -1.37	 -1.43	 -1.13	
	 (1.85)	 (1.86)	 (1.83)	 (1.86)	 (1.87)	
Ford	 -2.18	 -2.00	 -2.31	 -2.26	 -2.15	
	 (1.83)	 (1.84)	 (1.81)	 (1.84)	 (1.84)	
GM	 -1.61	 -1.47	 -1.59	 -1.69	 -1.49	
	 (1.80)	 (1.81)	 (1.79)	 (1.82)	 (1.82)	
Honda	 -0.51	 -0.38	 -0.31	 -0.52	 -0.10	
	 (2.02)	 (2.04)	 (2.01)	 (2.04)	 (2.04)	
Mazda	 1.42	 1.56	 1.32	 1.38	 1.47	
	 (2.46)	 (2.48)	 (2.44)	 (2.48)	 (2.48)	
Mitsubishi	 -1.89	 -1.70	 -2.13	 -1.93	 -1.92	
	 (2.16)	 (2.17)	 (2.14)	 (2.17)	 (2.17)	
Nissan	 -2.28	 -2.04	 -2.28	 -2.29	 -1.93	
	 (1.97)	 (1.99)	 (1.95)	 (1.98)	 (1.98)	
Toyota	 -0.69	 -0.59	 -0.68	 -0.73	 -0.56	
	 (1.90)	 (1.92)	 (1.89)	 (1.92)	 (1.91)	
Volkswagen	 -1.53	 -1.57	 -1.60	 -1.56	 -1.71	
	 (2.16)	 (2.17)	 (2.14)	 (2.18)	 (2.17)	
Constant	 0.49	 0.49	 0.79	 0.56	 0.91	
		 (2.35)	 (2.36)	 (2.34)	 (2.36)	 (2.36)	
Model-years	 409	 409	 409	 409	 409	
Wald	Chi²	 77.14	 78.85	 82.73	 77.54	 86.70	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses,	+	p<.10,	*	p<.05,	**p<01,	***p<.001	
NOTE:	Hyundai	is	omitted,	as	it	is	the	reference	category	
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Table	7:	Moderation	Panel	Regression	Results—Recall	Count		
		 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	
Stability	Control	 0.45	 0.81*	 	    
 (0.34)	 (0.38)	 	    
Luxury*Stability	Control	 	 -1.05*	 	    
  (0.50)	 	    
Navigation	Systems	 	  -2.00*	 -0.54	 	  
   (0.92)	 (1.63)	 	  
Luxury*Navigation	 	   -2.00	 	  
    (1.84)	 	  
Side	Airbag	 	    -0.26	 0.10	
	     (0.32)	 (0.34)	
Luxury*Side	Airbag	 	     -1.72**	
	 (0.34)	 (0.38)	 	    
Luxury	 -0.41	 0.01	 0.13	 0.32	 -0.19	 1.00	
	 (0.52)	 (0.56)	 (0.54)	 (0.56)	 (0.52)	 (0.67)	
Volume	 0.43***	 0.42***	 0.43***	 0.43***	 0.45***	 0.46***	
	 (0.12)	 (0.12)	 (0.12)	 (0.12)	 (0.12)	 (0.12)	
Years	Since	Launch	 -0.02	 -0.02	 -0.03*	 -0.03*	 -0.02+	 -0.03+	
	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	
2003	 -2.71	 -2.57	 -3.05	 -2.71	 -2.81	 -2.73	
	 (2.28)	 (2.27)	 (2.27)	 (2.28)	 (2.29)	 (2.28)	
2004	 0.12	 0.13	 0.18	 0.19	 0.15	 0.15	
	 (0.33)	 (0.33)	 (0.33)	 (0.33)	 (0.33)	 (0.33)	
2005	 0.17	 0.17	 0.27	 0.28	 0.24	 0.25	
	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	
2006	 -0.21	 -0.22	 -0.08	 -0.08	 -0.11	 -0.13	
	 (0.37)	 (0.37)	 (0.37)	 (0.37)	 (0.38)	 (0.37)	
2007	 -0.44	 -0.43	 -0.28	 -0.27	 -0.30	 -0.30	
	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.36)	 (0.36)	
2008	 -1.06**	 -1.06**	 -0.82*	 -0.81*	 -0.85*	 -0.86*	
	 (0.35)	 (0.35)	 (0.35)	 (0.35)	 (0.38)	 (0.37)	
2009	 -0.95*	 -0.99**	 -0.61+	 -0.60+	 -0.63	 -0.66	
	 (0.38)	 (0.38)	 (0.37)	 (0.37)	 (0.41)	 (0.40)	
2010	 -0.86*	 -0.91*	 -0.34	 -0.35	 -0.37	 -0.38	
	 (0.44)	 (0.44)	 (0.38)	 (0.38)	 (0.42)	 (0.42)	
2011	 1.44	 1.22	 2.42	 2.05	 2.08	 2.00	
	 (2.30)	 (2.29)	 (2.28)	 (2.29)	 (2.30)	 (2.29)	
Chrysler	 -1.07	 -0.89	 -1.37	 -1.34	 -1.43	 -1.40	
	 (1.86)	 (1.85)	 (1.83)	 (1.82)	 (1.86)	 (1.86)	
Ford	 -2.00	 -1.86	 -2.31	 -2.31	 -2.26	 -2.12	
	 (1.84)	 (1.83)	 (1.81)	 (1.80)	 (1.84)	 (1.84)	
GM	 -1.47	 -1.29	 -1.59	 -1.56	 -1.69	 -1.45	
	 (1.81)	 (1.80)	 (1.79)	 (1.78)	 (1.82)	 (1.82)	
Honda	 -0.38	 -0.09	 -0.31	 -0.26	 -0.52	 -0.29	
	 (2.04)	 (2.02)	 (2.01)	 (2.00)	 (2.04)	 (2.03)	
Mazda	 1.56	 1.69	 1.32	 1.36	 1.38	 1.46	
	 (2.48)	 (2.45)	 (2.44)	 (2.43)	 (2.48)	 (2.47)	
Mitsubishi	 -1.70	 -1.60	 -2.13	 -2.17	 -1.93	 -1.77	
	 (2.17)	 (2.15)	 (2.14)	 (2.13)	 (2.17)	 (2.17)	
Nissan	 -2.04	 -1.85	 -2.28	 -2.30	 -2.29	 -2.28	
	 (1.99)	 (1.97)	 (1.95)	 (1.94)	 (1.98)	 (1.98)	
Toyota	 -0.59	 -0.48	 -0.68	 -0.69	 -0.73	 -0.65	
	 (1.92)	 (1.90)	 (1.89)	 (1.88)	 (1.92)	 (1.91)	
Volkswagen	 -1.57	 -1.60	 -1.60	 -1.56	 -1.56	 -1.52	
	 (2.17)	 (2.15)	 (2.14)	 (2.13)	 (2.18)	 (2.17)	
Model-years	 409	 409	 409	 409	 409	 409	
Wald	Chi²	 78.85	 84.13	 82.73	 84.20	 77.54	 86.92	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses,	+	p<.10,	*	p<.05,	**p<01,	***p<.001	
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Figure 8: Interaction Term Graphs 
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Table	9:	Robustness	Checks—Recall	Count	 	   
		 Panel	Regression	
Negative	
Binomial	Panel	
D-K	Autocorrelation	
Panel	
Autocorrelation	
Panel	
GEE	
Panel	
		 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Stability	Control	 0.65+	 0.24+	 0.69+	 0.50	 0.64+	
	 (0.34)	 (0.13)	 (0.37)	 (0.34)	 -0.35	
Navigation	Systems	 -2.33*	 -1.25**	 -3.02**	 -2.35*	 -2.39**	
	 (0.94)	 (0.43)	 (0.90)	 (0.94)	 -0.9	
Side	Airbags	 -0.27	 -0.07	 -0.21	 0.16	 -0.31	
	 (0.31)	 (0.12)	 (0.63)	 (0.33)	 -0.31	
Volume	 0.40**	 0.16**	 0.67**	 0.40***	 0.45***	
	 (0.12)	 (0.05)	 (0.20)	 (0.12)	 -0.12	
Years	Since	Launch	 -0.02+	 -0.01	 -0.01+	 -0.02	 -0.02+	
	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 -0.01	
2003	 -3.14	 -0.86	 -2.45***	 -2.66	 -2.98	
	 (2.28)	 (0.79)	 (0.20)	 (2.11)	 -2.08	
2004	 0.18	 0.06	 0.31***	 0.12	 0.21	
	 (0.33)	 (0.11)	 (0.06)	 (0.27)	 -0.34	
2005	 0.27	 0.09	 0.51***	 0.18	 0.33	
	 (0.34)	 (0.12)	 (0.09)	 (0.33)	 -0.35	
2006	 -0.07	 -0.01	 0.37***	 -0.20	 0.02	
	 (0.37)	 (0.13)	 (0.09)	 (0.37)	 -0.38	
2007	 -0.22	 -0.03	 0.31	 -0.24	 -0.11	
	 (0.36)	 (0.13)	 (0.20)	 (0.38)	 -0.37	
2008	 -0.78*	 -0.20	 -0.30	 -0.82*	 -0.67+	
	 (0.38)	 (0.14)	 (0.27)	 (0.40)	 -0.38	
2009	 -0.68	 -0.17	 -0.01	 -0.76+	 -0.54	
	 (0.42)	 (0.16)	 (0.44)	 (0.44)	 -0.42	
2010	 -0.59	 -0.13	 0.02	 -0.62	 -0.45	
	 (0.48)	 (0.18)	 (0.54)	 (0.49)	 -0.47	
2011	 2.20	 0.63	 2.11***	 1.80	 2.17	
	 (2.32)	 (0.80)	 (0.54)	 (2.14)	 -2.12	
Luxury	 0.08	 0.05	 0.72*	 -0.04	 0.2	
	 (0.56)	 (0.22)	 (0.31)	 (0.51)	 -0.48	
Chrysler	 -1.13	 -0.30	 0.16	 -1.22	 -0.88	
	 (1.87)	 (0.71)	 (1.00)	 (1.69)	 -1.57	
Ford	 -2.15	 -0.64	 -1.86+	 -2.60	 -2.15	
	 (1.84)	 (0.70)	 (0.94)	 (1.67)	 -1.54	
GM	 -1.49	 -0.37	 -0.58	 -1.76	 -1.37	
	 (1.82)	 (0.69)	 (0.99)	 (1.64)	 -1.52	
Honda	 -0.10	 0.03	 -0.08	 -0.74	 -0.11	
	 (2.04)	 (0.78)	 (0.90)	 (1.82)	 -1.69	
Mazda	 1.47	 0.27	 2.11*	 0.87	 1.57	
	 (2.48)	 (0.94)	 (0.90)	 (2.18)	 -2.05	
Mitsubishi	 -1.92	 -0.62	 -1.53+	 -2.47	 -1.87	
	 (2.17)	 (0.84)	 (0.82)	 (1.93)	 -1.81	
Nissan	 -1.93	 -0.62	 -1.63	 -2.63	 -1.89	
	 (1.98)	 (0.76)	 (1.02)	 (1.79)	 -1.66	
Toyota	 -0.56	 -0.12	 0.19	 -1.09	 -0.45	
	 (1.91)	 (0.73)	 (1.15)	 (1.72)	 -1.6	
Volkswagen	 -1.71	 -0.47	 -1.56*	 -2.06	 -1.69	
	 (2.17)	 (0.83)	 (0.73)	 (1.97)	 -1.81	
Constant	 0.91	 15.93	 -3.22*	 1.12	 0.25	
		 (2.36)	 (274.43)	 (1.62)	 (2.20)	 -2.11	
Model-years	 409	 409	 409	 409	 409	
Wald	Chi²	 86.70	 59.47	 	 69.14	 96.81	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses,	+	p<.10,	*	p<.05,	**p<01,	
***p<.001	
		 		 		
	
NOTE:	Hyundai	is	omitted,	as	it	is	the	reference	category	 	   
